Conquest and rule in high medieval thought
(ERNST-DIETER HEHL)

In the middle ages the idea of conquest and rule was tightly bound up with the doctrines of just warfare and of the victorious war party’s claim for booty. The “ius gentium” put the defeated party’s territory under the conqueror’s rule; increasingly this was accepted only in just wars. The person of the defeated ruler was replaced by the conqueror. This replacement might occur at a level below royal rule; accordingly the conqueror would step into the conquered’s loyalty ties.

Rule by conquest in the high middle ages and early modern rule of occupation have some characteristics in common: replacement of the ruler, continuity of political and judicial structures of the conquered territories, loyalty towards the new ruler, and, in that case, loyalty of the new ruler to the respective overlord. The main difference is that in the High Middle Ages conquest made a change of rule lawful and lasting, whereas a temporally restricted change of rule was due only to pledging.

Bukhara under Mongol Rule - a case of occupation?
(JÜRGEN PAUL)

This study differs in many respects from the majority of contributions in this volume, the most important points being the much greater cultural distance between conquerors and conquered and the entirely different forms of city rule in medieval Middle Eastern cities.

Bukhara was conquered by the Mongols under Chingis Khan in 1220. The administration established by the Mongols was to remain basically the same throughout; the conquest was meant to be permanent in Bukhara and elsewhere from the start. At the local level, the Mongols cooperated with the family of notables, the Al-i Burhan, who had been dominating city affairs for some generations before. The „Mongol“ counterpart was an ethnic Khitai. The Mongols thus reproduced a pattern that had been set by their predecessors, the Qarakhitai. Not even the fact that the Mongols were neither Muslims nor were able to speak Persian was new. At regional level, a Muslim held power, Mahmud Yalavač; this level was not extant before.

Taken together, an astonishing degree of continuity emerges between the periods immediately before and after the Mongol conquest.
The mission of the virgin. Occupied France during the Hundred Years War
(MARTIN KINTZINGER)

The Virgin of Orleans made her message very clear to the representatives of the English regime in France: She would throw them out of her country if they did not stop destroying France. She was the most popular and – even up to now - best known, but by no means the only voice criticising English occupation. In the beginning there was only minor disputes about the legitimacy of English and French claims to the crown of France. Styling himself King of England and France it was Henry V. who from his victory at Agincourt in 1415 onward started the period of real occupation. Noblemen and citizens had to choose between both sides in order to survive (although they often took the wrong side). For the people in the country occupation meant nothing other than bloody and cruel suppression and suffering from English troops as well as from French irregular military gangs, both of whom were looking for their own advantage in times of everyday violence. It was due to these uncertainties that people in fact preferred a strictly organised English administration, as established by the duke of Bedford for instance, in contrast to a deeply desperate situation under French rule. Nevertheless, French identification with their native king and country never stopped and neither did resistance to and acts of aggression against the English regime. Contemporary commentators used powerful language to express that suffering. The period of violence functioned as a catalyst for progress in political theory about just and unjust government. However, the movement that ended the English occupation was the revival of national identity in occupied France, represented by the Virgin and her military and political success.

*Fraenum antiquae libertatis* – castles and the reinforcement of princely rule over towns and cities in the late medieval Empire (STEPHAN SELZER)

It is a common feature of the history of Late Medieval and Renaissance Italy that during the 14th and 15th centuries the autonomy of the Italian cities was limited by powerful princes (signori). These despots erected fortresses as an important instrument in order to secure their power over the citizens. As a result of occupations new fortresses were built; as a result of revolts the fortresses, symbolising tyrannical power, were razed to the ground. This was also the case in late medieval Germany. The most spectacular examples for the occupation of free cities were Berlin (1442), Mainz (1462) and Halle (1478). However, these occupations are not isolated examples of communities under attack by princely power in late medieval Germany. For that reason it is not surprising that German historians specialising in the history of cities, courts and castles, have neglected this problem until now. This paper tries to fill this gap by analysing examples of cities which
were part of the Hanseatic League. Firstly the chronology of the conflict between cities and lords is described. It appears that there was a correlation between the modernisation of the princely territorial state and the loss of autonomy of formerly free cities. Secondly the paper analyses the symbolic function of the erection and the destruction of fortresses beyond its obvious relevance for military purpose.

Theory, practice and experience of military occupation in the late middle ages
(JÖRG ROGGE)

In the late middle ages military occupation in our contemporary sense did not commonly occur but was an exception due to logistic, military, and judicial reasons. It was a not yet fully developed option of military practice that did not sharpen its profile before the fifteenth century. The combination of some of its elements, e. g. the idea of facilitating political success by military occupation of a certain city, region or state or of using reforms as early modern times. Occupation in its modern sense was one of the elements of warfare that – along with the infantry, the artillery or the transformation from contract to standing army – modified the quality of military conflicts in the fifteenth century during the transition from the middle ages to early modern period. After 1500 military occupation became a widely accepted and utilised means of achieving the aim of military actions, the lasting connection of conquered territory to the aggressors national territory.

Modernisation through occupation. The Saxon occupation of Friesland, 1498–1515
(PAUL BAKS)

From 1498 until 1515 Friesland was ruled by the dukes of Saxony. In the article this period is studied according to the social-historical occupation model from Helmut Stubbe da Luz. Special attention is given to institutional developments: under the reign of duke Albert and his sons Henry and George a well organised central government developed. After briefly reviewing the Saxon goals and the specific circumstances of Friesland, the various phases of the foreign occupation are described. Then specific aspects are discussed like behaviour of the occupiers, reactions of the occupied and size of the occupation force.

Duke Albert managed to gain control over Friesland by cunning and force. He destabilised the situation in Westergo in such a way that the Schieringers were willing to accept him as their lord-protector. The treaty in which mutual rights were laid down marked the beginning of the Saxon occupation. Other parts of the country like Oostergo and Zevenwouden were conquered and its inhabitants forced to accept the
treaty. The duke legalised his actions with the help of the king afterwards. In 1498 at
the diet of Freiburg he carried through his official appointment as hereditary imperial-
viceroy (‘ewiger gubernator und potestat’) in Friesland.

At first the Saxons occupiers saw themselves more or less tied to existing customs
and privileges. This changed in 1500 as a major uprising of the Frisians was repressed
and old rights were revoked. The new situation, however, could not be exploited, due
to the unexpected death of duke Albert. Henry was no longer interested in his heritage.
It was only after the accession of his elder brother George that the Saxon rule in
Friesland got new impetus. The following years showed a steady expansion of central
power and institutions. Though Frisian resistance gradually diminished, the Saxons
were unable to rally all groups behind their rule. They stayed dependent upon a small
native elite who primarily wanted to enlarge its own power, status and wealth.
Financial pressures and dynastic circumstances made George finally decide to sell his
Frisian title to Charles of Habsburg in 1515. The Saxon rule may have been rather
short; its importance in Frisian history nevertheless stands out. Under foreign pressure
Frisian society was reshaped and modernised in many respects.

Symbolic strategies in the occupation of the urban space during the first religious
wars in France (DENIS CROUZET)

When dealing with the occupation of the urban space one should certainly take into
consideration the politics of space investment and control pursued by military
authorities, their collaboration with civil authorities, and the difficulties generated by
the relationship between military and municipal authorities. Likewise, the
militarisation of the society and the tensions resulting from the costs of war need to be
examined.

But it is just as important to measure to what extent symbolic procedures become
necessary when capturing or re-capturing urban space, in times of war and even more
so in times of civil or religious war - procedures that give visibility to a power based
on exclusion and eradication of the religious adversary.

From the beginning of the 1560s up to 1572, the urban space, whilst being
controlled by the implementation of traditional techniques (execution, banishment or
imprisonment of suspects, denunciation, confiscation of property, replacement of the
military authorities, renovation of fortifications, control of space by the militia or by
guards of the watch, reception of paid garrisons, levying of taxes intended to finance
the defence of the town, exposure of real or fictitious conspiracies) becomes the scene
of a highly particularised semiotic effort. Each faction has its characteristic marks, its
specific symbolism. This effort expresses an intention of the protagonists of the
conflicts to project in a scenic manner the military commitment of the socio-religious
body, to transform the space into a metaphor of the social body henceforth purified, reunited, and restored to the truth of a unique God. Thus, violence inscribes its necessity into space.

It is important here to take into account that the Catholic and Protestant strategies or practices of space investment differ. They contrast and perform two symbolic plays: One satiates the space with signs, the other one demands the disappearance of signs. Two theological discourses become visible.

The occupation of the city as a special model? Comments on the papers of Paul Baks and Denis Crouzet (LUDOLF PELIZAEUS)

The two contributions differ in the geographical areas they are concerned with as well as in their time periods. Nevertheless a comparison should be made putting an emphasis on four fundamental points:

1. Is it possible to speak of a pattern of occupation for a city? Where and in which respect did other forms of occupation differ? Are there certain rituals for an occupation?
2. Are there any other examples, apart from the two presented, for the generation of instability in order to facilitate the occupation of a city?
3. How did the integration of the new administrative elite take place? Connected to this point it has to be asked whether a lasting interest did exist on the part of the occupying power.
4. Friesland marks a turn: The Saxons did not plan a temporary rule, but a lasting occupation. In the case of the French example this pattern applies even more as neither side could ever imagine the return of a city to the other denomination. The conscience of each party required the assumption of lasting rule for the ‘salvation’ of its inhabitants. It can be shown that for the early modern period a differentiation between a short term occupation (in the sense of the German besetzen/Besetzung) as opposed to a lasting occupation (in the sense of the German okkupieren/Okkupation) seems impossible. Therefore the author does not favour the application of a strict model describing the forms of occupation (Oikkupationsmodell).

„Occupatio bellica“ in the literature of the Law of Nations of Christianity, late middle ages to the 18th century (HEINHARD STEIGER)

The analysis of the history of the law of nations of occupatio bellica (military occupation) must take into consideration three dimensions or levels: the practice, the positive legal norms issued by the princes, the states or the commanders of the troops
together with the norms of treaties between the enemies, and the norms of natural and
general law (ius gentium) exposed in the literature by theologians and jurists. In this
paper I am only concerned with the latter. We may distinguish a school of jurists
trained in Roman law (14th and 15th century), natural law theologians (13th - 16th
century), natural law jurists (from the end of the 16th to the end of the 18th century) and
positivist European public law jurists (18th century). But the basic assumptions of all
of them did not change during the entire period. The reasoning differed.

Today military occupation is a special legal situation of a territory within a state
taken by an enemy during a war or a military action. It is regulated by the Hague
Convention on Land Warfare of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Additional Protocol I of 1977. The occupied territory stays under the sovereignty of
the state to which it belongs, but is under control of the occupying state who exercises
a special de facto rule. The occupying state is responsible for the well-being of the
population, which it has to achieve through good government and administration.
However, the occupying power has also rights to use the facilities and to requisition
immovable and movable goods for the need of its army. It may take measures to
prevent hostile acts by the local population.

The term *occupatio bellica* only appeared in the seventeenth century. In the late
middle ages and in the 16th century terms used were *captivitas*, *conquête*, *immobilia*
and *mobilia capta*, *servitudo*. The *occupatio bellica* was part of the laws of war (*ius in
bello*). As such it depended heavily on the theories of war and evolved together with
the development of the medieval theory of just war (*bellum iustum*) to the theory of
legal war (*bellum legale publicum*) in the 17th and 18th centuries. However, throughout
the period analysed in this paper the conqueror gained – in theory – full power over his
enemy’s territory. The conqueror exercised his own power, not that of the original
sovereign. The war is the legal basis of this acquisition of the dominium or later of the
imperium. At the beginning of the period *imperium* and *dominium* were not clearly
distinct forms of power over the land. After the distinction became increasingly clear
and accepted in theory the conqueror won the *imperium*. Vattel and other authors at
the end of the 18th century felt the need for acceptance of the new regime by the local
population. The occupying state was free to annex territory, to give it to a federate or
to leave it as a political entity. As long as the war was going on, the occupiers could
loose the occupied territory again if the fortunes of the war changed. Only by a peace
treaty or the definite victory did the situation become a fact and a legal certainty. The
conqueror’s rights to dispose of the territory were also upheld by Grotius. The
rationale was that the conqueror was allowed to reap his just military rewards already
during the prosecution of war itself. This was not only the case if he claimed the
occupied territory for himself, for instance on the ground of heritage, but also if he had
other claims or the claims did not concern the territory occupied. When the
differentiation between dominium and imperium was generally accepted, the
conqueror only got the *imperium*. He did not become owner of the land, and especially not of the property of the inhabitants. The property of the inimical prince or of the state became property of the conqueror or could be seized by him. Movable goods could also be taken. For a long time plundering was allowed. The question was how long after the beginning of an occupation plundering was acceptable and to whom the plundered movable goods belonged, the king or state, the commander or the soldier. The answers differed. For a long time people could be killed, taken into captivity or even servitude. The idea was that the whole country including the population was the enemy and not only the prince, and that everybody could be of some help to the prince. But between Christians servitude became increasingly morally unacceptable and prohibited. Captives were often handed back in return for a ransom. Grotius differentiated between strict law and *aequitas*. Under strict natural law he conceded far-reaching rights and powers to the conqueror over the lives and the freedom of the people, and over the movable goods of the population of the conquered territory. However, by referring to *aequitas* he demanded that women, children, old people, and others should be protected. They could only be taken into captivity or killed if they were guilty of something. Vattel did not make this distinction any more. The voluntary law of nations was equity law in itself and therefore only necessity gave legal causes to act against the population. If the development of the war forced the conqueror to devastate the occupied territory, the destruction of its fortified and other places was allowed. However, some authors maintained that the cutting of fruit-trees and the destruction of other goods necessary for the survival of the population was not permitted. Against unlawful acts legal remedies were available. As a general rule peace treaties in this period included an amnesty which excluded private claims against the former occupier. These treaties often regulated the restitution of territory conquered or occupied during the war.

On the whole one can say that the traditions which gave far-reaching rights to the conqueror were accepted in the literature during this period. However, the authors increasingly tried to limit these rights and by the way of the concept of *aequitas* to introduce more protection for the local population. Moreover, it seems that the practice did not always follow a set pattern; in some cases the occupiers held territory only as security for the peace treaty.

**Swedish rule in Magdeburg and Halberstadt during the Thirty Years War, 1631-1635**

(MARKUS MEUMANN)

Sweden was among the territorial winners of the Thirty Years War. As a result of the Peace of Westphalia the Swedish crown received in compensation for her considerable wartime expenditure control over western Pomerania and the until then ecclesiastical
 principalities of Bremen and Verden. Less well known is the fact that as a result of the initial enormous victories the Swedish crown managed to set up several temporary governments of occupations in the Empire beyond Pomerania during the course of the Thirty Years War, as in Mayence and in Franconia. In the ecclesiastical principalities of Magdeburg and Halberstadt which had been conquered by the Swedish army during the summer of 1631, the Calvinist prince Louis of Anhalt, who was allied to Sweden, was proclaimed governor. Despite the death of Gustavus Adolphus in 1632, Louis’ government lasted until 1635, when, following to the Peace of Prague, he had to relinquish the administration to the elected administrators, the Saxon prince Augustus and the Archduke Leopold William.

The administration of the two principalities of Magdeburg and Halberstadt was in the hands of a government constituted in the main from followers of the governor. A problem presented itself due to the fact that there were a number of Calvinists among them which raised suspicions towards the government with the strictly Lutheran Swedes as well as with the estates of the two principalities. The task of establishing a Lutheran church constitution was therefore given to the Swedish bishop and former court chaplain Botvodi rather than the government.

From the beginning the government had only limited room for manoeuvre and confined itself to the fulfilment of demands made by the Swedish army. Thus, the Swedish general Johan Banér, who resided on his Egeln estate, appeared to be the actual ruler of the two principalities. The Swedish policy towards the occupied territories changed after the death of Gustavus Adolphus; they were used as a resource for the supply of the army. This increased the impression of an occupation among the population and reduced the legitimacy of Swedish rule. The Swedish chancellor Oxenstierna forced the resignation of the Calvinist members of the government, among them the chancellor Stalmann, in 1634, a move most likely instigated by the estates. The governor Ludwig had to accept the appointment of a commissioner answerable to Oxenstierna and was thus progressively reduced to a recipient of orders.

After having offered to step down from his post during the summer of 1634 he finally resigned on 27 June 1635 fearing to be otherwise excluded from the peace between the Emperor and the Protestant estates and losing his own principality of Anhalt.

The arranged occupation. Dutch garrisons in Brandenburgian castles in the Lower Rhine Area (MICHAEL KAISER)

During the hereditary crisis in the duchies of the Lower Rhine area in the early 17th century, the Dutch Republic took control over several towns in Cleves. This was the beginning of Dutch control over Brandenburg territory which lasted the following
decades. In contrast to many other examples, the Dutch occupied the land not only with Brandenburg’s consent, but they were also welcomed by the local inhabitants.

The extraordinary period of occupation turned out to be a serious problem for the Brandenburg ruler. In the course of the years the territorial estates apparently showed more respect towards the Dutch occupiers as the legitimate authority than to Frederick William, the elector of Brandenburg. For him, the long absence of manifest Brandenburg rule made it difficult to demonstrate his sovereignty.

To maintain his claims and his power over the duchy of Cleves the Great Elector tried to establish his own garrisons. In the end it was not the increasing military power that confirmed Brandenburg rule, but the feebleness of the Dutch Republic. When in the 1670s the Dutch failed to stop the French from invading and occupying Cleves, their rule was brought into discredit. In contrast to that, the French occupation was only a short episode and left Frederick William as the undisputed ruler of the Lower Rhine area.

To sum up, the example of Cleves shows the risks of a long-term occupation. Although the Dutch commanders in Cleves did not touch civic rule and stuck strictly to their military affairs, the duration of their occupation characterised them as new authorities. The Dutch occupation was established with Brandenburg’s consent, but the occupation weakened power and reputation of the Brandenburg elector, the legitimate ruler of this territory.

The Dutch occupation of Lille, from 1708 to 1713
(CATHERINE DENYS)

From October 25th, 1708 until June 3rd, 1713, the town of Lille was under Dutch occupation, after a two and a half months’ siege. Lille was the most famous French stronghold north of Paris and its conquest by an English and Dutch army was a resounding episode during the Spanish War of Succession (1702-1713). The town (which was French only since its conquest by Louis XIV in 1667) was to return to France only after the signature of the Peace of Utrecht.

The representatives of the Hague in Lille respected the traditions of municipal home rule and kept the aldermen in place. The Dutch occupation necessitated some minor administrative changes (the creation of a superior court which took the place of the French parliament of Tournai, the suppression of French taxes, but also the maintenance of export taxes with the Netherlands, the reorganisation of a communal watch), but the switch of sovereignty from France to the United Provinces was carried out without great difficulties and, as a general rule, without wronging the town.

The fact that this change of sovereignty seemed to have been so simple reflected a common political culture which Lille shared with The Hague. Beside the « right of
conquest and war» the Dutch authorities preferred to point out historical bonds, when the Low Countries included Northern and Southern provinces, during the 16th century. The Dutch government also tried to rely on the situation before 1667 and repeatedly reminded the aldermen that they meant to respect the liberties of the land and to hint that they aimed at restoring the communal liberties which had been curtailed in the course of a French centralising dominion which had lasted 40 years. In short, the Dutch posed as liberators.

This position was accepted by the aldermen and everyone admitted that their relations with the Dutch representatives were good enough, even if some minor clashes could not be avoided. As for the relation between the Dutch troops and the inhabitants of Lille, it would seem that the few incidents reported were not different from what happened in any other garrison town. The only issue which separated the occupying forces from the inhabitants of Lille was religion. The people of Lille were staunch Catholics and did not take kindly to the establishment of a Calvinist garrison.

For five years The Hague undoubtedly carried out a policy which in many respects aimed at winning over the people of Lille by treating the town as well as possible. However, times were hard and the war obliged people to make sacrifices. The people who suffered could not help but put the blame on the occupying forces. Last but not least, especially at the beginning of the 18th century, the very notion of a United Low Countries which underpinned the establishment of positive relations between Lille and The Hague had become a mere historical fiction. Since the partition of the 16th century, the Northern Low Countries and the Southern Low Countries had drifted apart politically, culturally and economically. Bonds and blood ties remained, but the gap between Lille and The Hague was too wide to be bridged. Time had moved on and the people in Lille willingly accepted their return to France in 1713.

The French occupation of the Austrian Netherlands during the War of the Austrian Succession (LUCIEN BÉLY)

The paper takes as its point of departure H. Van Houttes’ thesis that the population of the Austrian Netherlands experienced the French invasion between 1744 and 1748 merely as a regime change, rather than a hostile occupation. On this basis, the author deals with the introduction and organisation of the French tax administration (régie) in the occupied territories under the leadership of the Intendant of Flanders, Moreau de Séchelles.

In the course of the progressing military occupation the tax administration was constantly expanded, in spite of initial difficulties and resistance from the local Austrian treasury officials. This happened even though the French officials feared that despite the unchecked sovereignty of the French crown over the occupied territory the
lands could revert back to the Queen of Hungary as part of a peace settlement. The introduction of the French tax system meant for the occupied not just new burdens and conflicts, but also positive expectations. The newly established institutions were confronted by petitions concerning reforms and changes, as well as by a series of outstanding cases where the plaintiffs were hoping for a positive resolution of their tax affairs as a result of the change of sovereignty. The snapshot of the regime change offers not only a detailed picture of the newly introduced measures, but also of the system existing up to the point of the military occupation.

Conflicts between occupiers and occupied arose mainly as a result of the needs and demands of the army. The raising of taxes and excise duties was left in part with the estates of the occupied provinces to enable them to fulfil their obligation for financing the war and the maintenance of the army. However, it was this arrangement that frequently led to clashes with the estates, including military action, if they failed to meet their obligations. The maintenance of the troops caused competition and conflicts of authority also among the institutions or office holders charged with the administration of the occupied territories, namely between the army, favoured through many privileges, and the civil tax administration, which considered itself obstructed in the execution of its duties by the army.

**Military Occupation in the 18th Century – remarks concerning a specific situation**

(HORST CARL)

This paper is intended to provide an appropriate definition of the concept of “military occupation”. This is understood as a specific situation which is characterised since the early modern period by a certain rationality of action and by specific administrative and military settings, which were still relevant in the 20th century. Military occupation is a highly standardised situation deserving of a description in the categories of the law of nations. However, the law of nations is not understood here as a set of rules that determine practice to a greater or lesser degree. Rather it is hoped to benefit from the jurisconsults’ faculty to formulate criteria for the definition of this situation. In this manner, it will be possible to avoid an anachronistic understanding as well as a political and moral use of the phenomenon “occupation”, which are both imprecise.

Occupation is seen as a phenomenon of modern history that presupposes the development of modern statehood (W. Reinhard). Therefore, an application of the concept to pre-modern or non-European societies is problematic. The same holds true for a metaphoric or political and moral use that isolates occupation from its context in order to remove legitimacy from governments retrospectively.
Sie nennen uns, wie gesagt, auch nur die deutschen Hunde. The garrison of Soldiers from Brunswick in Canada 1776-1783 (STEPHAN HUCK)

The paper deals with the Brunswick troops in British service during the American War of Independence, focussing the regiments stationed in Canada, with the aim of investigating the characteristic aspects of occupation in early modern history. Its purpose is to describe the legacy of occupation in a post-occupational phase. The analysis differentiates three categories: international law, administration and the perceptions of occupiers and occupied.

The deployment of Brunswick troops in Canada took place in a phase during which the British government in that province doubtlessly could claim to be legal under international law. This claim, however, rested on the effectiveness of British power which was threatened by several external factors. In its second part the paper deals with the function of the Brunswick forces within the context of the local administration in the parishes. The underlying framework was constituted by government measures like the far-reaching Quebec-Act, which ensured the loyalty of the French speaking Catholic clergy and the upper classes. The analysis centres on the cooperative efforts undertaken by the Brunswick troops and the local administration to guarantee the adherence of the local inhabitants to the crown.

The third and last part concentrates on the perceptions of the occupiers and the occupied. In the case present especially the contrast of the denominations – Catholic dominated Canadians on the one hand, Protestant German mercenaries on the other – and the growing influence of the press took part in shaping the public opinion of each other; an opinion, that was formed by ignorance and prejudice on both sides. The perceptions underwent their test during the frequent contacts of Canadians and soldiers from Brunswick, particularly in the course of the billeting of Brunswick troops in Canadian households.

Reflections on a comparative history of occupation using the example of the Napoleonic rule in Northern Germany (HELMUT STUBBE-DA LUZ)

Historical events and processes are three-way located: geographically, temporally and categorically. Many historians traditionally feel sceptical towards the latter method of classification (concerning the adequate category as for instance “war”, “peace”, “revolution”, “restoration” etc.), although they practice this method inevitably and continually – although implicitly, without talking about that. They draw their terms (such as “domination”, “power”, “rule”, “reign”, “government” etc.) from an unwritten (but desirable) “Dictionary of universal history”, which however they do not wish to
see realised. This is due to the fear that it could deprive the historical events and processes of their “uniqueness”.

Using the example of the occupation, which Napoleon imposed over parts of Northern Germany between 1803 and 1814, the paper outlines a model of “occupation”, which is fairly suitable for all other cases of occupation (once those cases have been identified) - independently of space and time, across the historical boundaries created artificially by historicistic historians. Occupations are a piece of the "natural history" of human societies. Some suggestions are made here about a series of questions: (1.) how can a complex of occupation be arranged into phases? (2.) What sorts of polities, policies and politics can be expected on the part of the (military or civil) occupation forces? (3.) What results are produced in the framework of the social change induced by an occupation?